




Memory is crucial in the process of heritage making, and is ‘vital for individu-
als, groups and communities in forming collective identities’ (Apaydin 2020, 1). 
The negotiation around its meaning, however, is by no means easy. In  critical 
heritage studies this is addressed as the ‘problem of memory’, given that such 
a process can generate forgetting, manipulation, appropriations, contrasting 
visions around commemorations, or even destruction or removal of heritage 
objects for the sake of eliminating those memories (Harrison 2013). It is worth 
reminding ourselves of the fortunate definition by Laurajane Smith that  heritage 
is not (only) an object but rather ‘an active process engaged with the construc-
tion and negotiation of meaning through remembering’ (Smith 2006, 66).
As the four articles in this section demonstrate, heritage is deeply ingrained 
in policy making and shaped by evident, or relatively hidden, economical 
interests and agendas. It is for this reason that the process of heritage-making, 
alongside the selective memory that this implies, might be quite controversial 
in contemporary China, and therefore worth investigation.
Harriet Evans introduces the increasing conflicts between top-down prac-
tices of cultural heritage in China and a variety of grassroots voices. The aim 
is to highlight the interesting emergence of creative practices around heritage, 
beyond ‘a binary relationship between state and locality’, and to understand a 
multiplicity of heritages on the ground. This sheds light into the exceptional 
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dynamism of localities in China (including commercial enterprises, tourism 
and local communities) in claiming their heritage, while also questioning their 
approaches to heritage reinvention and authenticity. 
Philipp Demgenski focuses on intangible cultural heritage (ICH) prac-
tices, showing the increasing attention around this in China, since the coun-
try joined the UNESCO Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible 
 Cultural  Heritage of Humanity in 2004. As also argued in the previous post, 
the  government plays a central role in heritage production, in this case in the 
process of identifying and listing ICH, which remains pretty much a matter of 
the state. On the other hand, this is often seen as an opportunity for local com-
munities to engage actively with ICH, not least for the legitimate attempt to 
improve their livelihood.
Paul Kendall focuses instead on an interesting case of memory’s omission, 
using as a case study the park created to commemorate the Third Front, a 1960s 
Maoist military industrial project in Kaili, Guizhou. Here, the process of her-
itage-making around this industrial legacy has been unpopular leading to the 
closure of the park, given the recent rebranding strategy of the town around 
its ethnic Miao and Dong minorities. It remains to be seen whether this failed 
attempt was originally motivated by genuine, or more instrumental, intentions 
to give visibility to the industrial workers’ history.
The final piece from Lisheng Zhang introduces the Jianchuan Museum Clus-
ter, China’s largest non-state museum, in Chengdu, Sichuan. The collection is a 
material culture repository of China’s twentieth century history, which includes 
objects of controversial periods, such as the resistance war against Japan and 
the Cultural Revolution, representing contentious memories of a recent past 
yet to be fully disclosed. 
In bringing together these pieces a sense of unresolved tension between offi-
cial and other memories, and similarly, between state-led and more spontane-
ous forms of heritage-making, emerges. One might therefore legitimately ask 
whether this is a typical trait of contemporary China or part of a more general, 
and international, discussion around heritage. 
Indeed, the grand narrative of modern nation states, and the monumental-
ity of their heritage, has been associated with a self-referential and dominant 
‘authorised discourse of heritage’ (ADH) (Smith 2006), as opposed to ‘everyday 
heritage’, a people-led practice of heritage-making that shapes ordinary, yet no 
less important, historic landscapes and places (Mosler 2019). ADH, however, 
has historic roots in the western practice of material heritage classification and 
preservation (Choay 1992), which, being so pervasive and widespread, has 
actually been prevented for a long time from appreciating a variety of unortho-
dox approaches emerging in other contexts (Verdini 2017). Asian countries, 
Japan in primis, has struggled since the early 1990s in the recognition of other 
notions of immaterial authenticity, and they have played an important role in 
challenging the dominant western discourse, resulting in the affirmation of 
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alternative and intangible forms of heritage more suitable for their tradition 
(Taylor and Verdini, forthcoming). 
Moreover, this is not the only arena of renegotiation around heritage in the 
international debate. A similar role has been played by emerging landscape 
approaches to heritage, such as on the cultural landscapes and, more recently, 
on the historic urban landscape (Taylor 2018). In essence, there has been a 
broad shift of attention from the monumental to the ordinary, from the tan-
gible to the intangible, from objects to processes, and this emerging discur-
sive practice, no longer shaped by monolithic identities or fixed memories, has 
found hostility everywhere.
To put it bluntly, what is found in China is common in many other parts of 
the world, especially when centralised systems of heritage management still 
persist, or new nationalistic discourses surge (see the brilliant Heritage and 
Brexit of Pendlebury and Veldpaus 2018) with the results of minority voices 
and memories being marginalised and silenced in the heritage arena. Yet, the 
question of what is different about China remains. This would not serve 
the purpose for backing a supposed Chinese exceptionalism, which is increas-
ingly used as an annoying rhetoric of greatness in the new Chinese nationalist 
discourse (Ho 2014). Rather, this will be used, in the final notes that follow, 
to highlight a few points to contextualise Chinese approaches to heritage, and 
to suggest the idea that every scholarly judgment about China should take into 
account various aspects of its complexity, not least the scales of the phenomena 
observed. These points are about: cultural soft power, cultural heritage and eco-
nomic development, and authenticity in heritage making.
Let’s first address cultural soft power. China’s efforts to revert, in a few years, 
an image of polluted industrialising ‘world factory’ into an advanced economy, 
investing in culture, innovation and creativity is probably unprecedented. 
Heritage, both tangible and intangible, has played a major role in this (Zhu 
and Maags 2020). The list of Chinese world heritage sites has exponentially 
increased; and similarly the support to all kinds of UNESCO programmes. The 
number of culture and creative-led conservation projects promoted literally in 
every city, as well as museums, events, and cultural performances within them, 
is countless. For a country that has modernised very fast at the expense of 
its traditional culture, let alone the still painful memory of the Cultural Revolu-
tion, it is a remarkable achievement that could serve as a model for other fast 
urbanising countries of Asia and Africa.
When it comes to cultural heritage and economic development, there is a 
sense of a certain instrumentalism in every project of heritage conservation or 
promotion in China. It is part of a very effective entrepreneurial governance, 
accompanied by ad hoc city branding strategies that push localities to com-
pete and to seek for economic gains at all levels, implying large scale heritage 
regeneration, and aggressive promotion and marketing of cultural resources. 
However, as some pieces have explained (Evans and Demgenski in particular), 
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this often finds local communities allied in this process, given the promise of 
an improved livelihood. It is nevertheless hard to distinguish in China whether 
projects are motivated by genuine intention to bring benefits to communities 
or by pure economic calculus, in the hands of few, due to the lack of account-
ability of policy-making.
Finally, when it comes to authenticity in heritage-making, the process of 
selection of memory, and material objects, behind any heritage-making pro-
cess (see for example Kendall and Zhang) is often unclear. So is the question 
of whether heritage represents the multiplicity of existing voices or, on the 
contrary, it is subject to a process of authentication which lacks inclusion and 
diversity, under the diktat of the state’s propaganda.
In dealing with China, even after many years, I am always hesitant to reach 
any black or white conclusion. In respect to heritage and memory, one might 
argue that China is no different from many other countries, in the  ever-present 
negotiations or clash between dominant and emerging discourses around 
 heritage. When looking at the big picture, and in observing how much the 
country has evolved in recent years, one can simply appreciate such endeav-
our. Where the analysis becomes more granular there is no doubt that some 
 controversies arise.
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5.1 Grassroots Values and Local Cultural Heritage in China
Harriet Evans
What is cultural heritage in China today? Dominant top-down practices of cul-
tural heritage in China are accompanied by the massive construction of muse-
ums, competition for UNESCO recognition, and projects of heritage tourism 
increasingly associated with the One Belt One Road initiative and designed to 
boost regional and local incomes. But how do local communities both impli-
cated in these large-scale projects and their discursive effects approach the 
issue of what to preserve? How do local people’s memories of their past cultural 
experiences inform local projects of cultural preservation?
Grassroots Values and Local Cultural Heritage in China is a collection of papers 
that emerged out of a three-year research grant awarded by the  Leverhulme 
Trust, for a project titled ‘Conflicts in Cultural Value: Localities and Heritage 
in Southwest China’. The papers in this volume move beyond the southwest 
to include areas stretching from Tibet, northern Yunnan and Anren, Sichuan, to 
Huangshan in Anhui and Quanzhou on the south-eastern  seaboard. Together 
they offer an ethnographic exploration of diverse places and practices, under-
taken largely by young Chinese scholars. The overall aim is to foreground the 
local as a site of negotiation between state, entrepreneurial and local  community 
interests in an economic, political, and cultural context in which heritage prac-
tice in China has been transforming local social, economic, and cultural life and 
reshaping domestic and global notions of China’s national identity. 
We approach the local not as a fixed spatial definition of place but as a  shifting 
arena of everyday life and belonging underpinning ordinary social interac-
tions. Heritage emerges as a series of creative practices and  possibilities that by 
 definition are multiple. Given the pervasive power and appeal of the state’s ambi-
tious projects of museum building and world heritage  recognition, a  dominant 
heritage discourse of ‘文化遗产’ (wenhua yichan) has  percolated through to 
local people’s experience of how they negotiate ideas about  preservation and 
conservation of local cultural value. The complex picture of heritage across 
our different sites cannot be explained by a binary relationship between state 
and locality, particularly if the latter is inscribed with ideas of resistance and 
 subversion of state power. Rather, multiple heritages are operating at different 
levels and through different modes of encounter and memory between state, 
commercial enterprise, tourism, and local communities. Potential sites of con-
flict between locality and state lead to negotiated redefinitions of heritage—to 
heritage alternatives—to accommodate desires both to maximise economic 
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benefit from heritage construction and to preserve locally-centred ritual and 
cultural practices. It would be mistaken to think that the local is not concerned 
with economic benefit; the desire for material well-being is locally as well as 
centrally defined. Rather than see the economic as contrasted with local rit-
ual/cultural practices, it is a matter of accommodating the varying desires and 
hopes whose political, economic/material, spiritual, and ethical implications 
come into contact with each other, leading to a redefinition of heritage and the 
remaking of the local. Crossing our different sites of enquiry this volume shows 
a diversity of ‘locals’—the remote rural, the urban neighbourhood, the sacred 
mountain, mainstream heritage sites, and the museum town—as different and 
alternative heritage practices spanning Han and ethnic minority practices. 
From powerful centres of national heritage value, such as Quanzhou, through 
to small Naxi communities off the beaten track in northern Yunnan, wenhua 
yichan has thus brought a new focus to people’s ideas about what they think 
is valuable, and what then becomes a value of loss. It has brought a precision 
to local questions about what people need/who people are that may be under 
threat and therefore in danger of losing. It also redefines tradition in light of the 
new heritage projects that have been emerging across the sites of our research 
and beyond, leading to what can be thought of as ‘the newness of tradition’.
One crucial dimension of the alternatives that are emerging in this process is 
the framing of moral/ethical ideals and realities, often around claims, explicit 
Fig 5.1.a: Baishuitai, Yunnan. Photo by the author.
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or implicit, to authenticity. Some scholars argue that the ‘authentic’ (yuansheng-
tai 原生态) may be best understood as a component of a national discourse of 
cultural authority shored up by tradition. In conditions where  cultural  heritage 
offers substantial economic returns, the evocation of ‘authentic traditions’ 
may cement a subjective and collective sense of belonging and memory that 
 paradoxically both reproduces and seeks to resolve possibly violent competition 
for resources. Such competition is also fed by the state’s increasing interest in 
asserting control over ‘cultures’ by investing more and more in heritage build-
ing projects. Again, claims to authenticity may be prescribed by appeals to the 
outside, in the form of bringing in expertise of local intellectuals and heritage 
practitioners, or of appealing to diasporic yearnings of belonging. In the pro-
cess of such appeals, the local becomes separate and assumes a distinct identity. 
Elsewhere, such claims may be associated with practices of what some might 
term the ‘deep rural’, or increasingly marginalised landscapes and places linked 
to ancestral legacies of a deep past which exists in memories and fragments of 
ritual practices retrieved from recent decades of violence and  destruction.
Fig 5.1.b: Baishuitai, Yunnan. Photo by the author.
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All these alternative heritages converge in their concern for the right to pre-
serve and conserve for the future. At one level this concern forms part of a 
shared yet contested discourse about how and what to preserve —what old 
things to preserve and what new things to construct. It is also present in an 
ethical value of remembering as a creative process involving the return of peo-
ple to their hometown/village of origin to invest in honouring their ancestry. 
Ideas of preserving and remembering may also be associated with loss and fear 
of humiliation. They also have to distinguish between different things/entities 
that are being preserved and remembered at different levels in the relationships 
between people, things, ideas and places. All these create different heritage val-
ues that operate in different ways, with different meanings, creating differently 
embodied and spatialised notions of subjecthood and cultural value.
5.2 ‘When It Comes to Intangible Cultural Heritage, Everyone 
Is Always Happy’: Some Thoughts on the Chinese Life  
of a UNESCO Convention
Philipp Demgenski
In early 2017, I joined the UNESCO Frictions Project (UNESCO Frictions n.d.) 
and set out to study how the UNESCO 2003 Convention for the Safeguarding of 
the Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity (UNESCO 2016) is implemented 
in China. In this post I reflect upon some of my experiences and findings. 
The 2003 Convention defines Intangible Cultural Heritage (ICH) as ‘the 
practices, representations, expressions, knowledge, skills—as well as the instru-
ments, objects, artefacts and cultural spaces associated therewith—that com-
munities, groups and, in some cases, individuals recognise as part of their 
 cultural heritage’ (UNESCO 2016, Article 2). Accordingly, cultural heritage is 
not (only) material, fossilised and monumental, but dynamic and subjective. 
Also, it is the so-called ‘heritage bearers’ and not experts who are to define 
heritage, imbue it with meaning and value and work towards its safeguarding 
and management. By focusing on heritage communities, on ideas of participa-
tion and self-representation, the founding fathers (Proschan 2018) of the 2003 
Convention also particularly envisioned this convention as a tool for good gov-
ernance and the protection of human rights.
China was among the first countries to ratify it in 2004. Since then, impressive 
amounts of ICH elements have been identified domestically, legal texts have 
been devised and the ICH concept has found much resonance in the media and 
among the general public. China was also quick in setting up its own admin-
istrative and institutional framework. It now has a comprehensive national 
inventory system for ICH elements at four administrative levels (national, pro-
vincial, municipal and district/county) and an additional four-tier inventory 
for so-called ‘Representative ICH Transmitters,’ (daibiaoxing chuancheng ren 
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代表性传承人) (ihchina.cn). Locally known as fei yi 非遗 (lit. ‘non-heritage,’ 
see Fig 5.2.a.), ICH is indeed everywhere, especially when one actively looks 
for it. During fieldwork, I found it at airports, in train stations, shopping malls, 
on mobile APPs, in the media, in specially designed ICH expos, in academia 
and, above all, in political discourse. I heard many proud remarks about China 
being particularly rich in ICH. Bringing up ICH seemed like a cue for people 
to ascertain that ICH and China simply belong together. A Chinese folklorist 
who also advises the government on ICH matters once told me: ‘Normally, it’s 
always either the people that are not happy about the government or the gov-
ernment that is not happy about the people. Only in ICH, everyone is always 
happy: government, scholars, people’. As of early 2020, China has 40 elements 
inscribed in the UNESCO ICH lists, more than any other country (Zheng and 
Qing 2020). 
There are a number of reasons for this ‘ICH fever’ (fei yi re 非遗热). The 2003 
Convention and with it the ICH concept entered China precisely at a point 
when notions of ‘traditional culture’ (chuantong wenhua 传统文化) or ‘folk 
customs’ (minsu 民俗) re-emerged in the political and public discourse, after 
having been under attack during the Cultural Revolution and largely ignored 
during the early ‘reform years’. In 2002, then President Jiang Zemin famously 
called for ‘the protection of major cultural heritage and outstanding folk arts’ 
(Jiang 2002) and hereby heralded the beginning of a new identity for cultural 
heritage as not being antithetical to, but very much compatible with the goals 
of economic growth and modernisation. ICH presented the state with a dis-
tinct value framework to appraise, control, but also to legitimise many cultural 
practices and traditions that were previously discarded as undesired supersti-
tions. Under this newly gained umbrella of legitimacy, officially-endorsed ICH 
could then also be exploited for the growing domestic tourist industry and the 
increasing desire of people to travel and consume ‘culture’. Especially in recent 
years, ICH transmitters have been urged to innovate and tailor their respective 
Fig 5.2.a: Example of ‘non-heritage’ discourse. Photo by the author.
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products to market demands (Hu 2017); there now exist a number of mobile 
APPs that sell ICH products as luxury goods. Internationally, the introduction 
of ICH has allowed China to further engage in cultural diplomacy, consoli-
date its soft-power and to spread a specific image of ‘cultural China’ around the 
globe; being a member of an international legislation has also helped the state 
to legitimate policies at home. 
It is clear: ICH matters in and to China and it is ubiquitous in everyday life. 
But looking at domestic understandings, both on the level of legislation and 
public discourse, there exists a rather stark discrepancy vis-à-vis the UNE-
SCO definition described above. A scholar and ICH advisor to the Ministry 
of  Culture and Tourism once even told me that ‘ICH in China is not actually 
ICH’. Rather than defining ICH as something ephemeral, mobile, and sponta-
neous that belongs to the communities whose heritage is at stake, China’s own 
ICH Law from 2011 (State Council 2011), for example, ‘is formulated for the 
purposes of inheriting and promoting the distinguished traditional culture of 
the Chinese nation…’ The law also refers to the idea of ‘authenticity’ (ibid., 
Article 4), which had deliberately been excluded from the 2003 Convention. 
Chinese ICH is, in fact, conceptually much closer to the World Heritage Con-
vention from 1972 and allows for external actors (scholars, officials) to evalu-
ate and authenticate heritage. The law is also largely void of the key ideas of 
community participation, merely stating that ‘the State shall encourage and 
support its citizens, legal persons and other organisations to participate in the 
work concerning the protection of intangible cultural heritage’ (ibid., Article 9, 
emphasis added). Someone closely working with the Ministry of Culture once 
stated half-jokingly that ‘in China, if they don’t control or regulate you, your 
participation is already quite significant’, explaining that the idea of community 
participation is really only something understood and used by experts who 
have a good grasp of heritage terminology (Bortolotto et. al 2020). Generally 
and little surprisingly, Chinese ICH is essentially a matter of the state. In the 
absence of the political ideals of good governance and human rights that per-
meate the discourse at UNESCO, Chinese ICH is largely reduced to a general 
idea of ‘culture’ and even though many actors involved in the ICH field see the 
need to ‘keep this culture alive’, it is essentially the state that not only decides 
how this should be done, but also what ICH is and who it belongs to. 
At the same time, recalling the above quote about everyone in ICH being happy, 
the introduction of this concept has also been an enabling and  empowering 
force. For example, many practitioners and official ICH transmitters in China 
conveyed to me that they are indeed happy about the existence of the ICH frame-
work, that they feel ‘more recognised’ and, most commonly-heard, that ICH has 
allowed them to earn money and make a livelihood from their cultural practices 
to a degree that was not possible before. So within the broader  political econ-
omy of China, we may say that ICH has provided many  practitioners with an 
opportunity to participate in and benefit from national economic  development 
and modernisation. This form of participation may be  different from that 
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 envisioned by the 2003 Convention, but it would be  erroneous to jump to the 
conclusion that China’s ‘take’ on ICH is somehow wrong. After all, even though 
politics are often seen as standing in the way of genuine safeguarding and pres-
ervation work (ironically often by those who most passionately believe in the 
political potential of the 2003 Convention), ICH is by definition political and it 
is also never neutral. When cultural  practices and traditions are ‘diagnosed’ as 
ICH (Hafstein 2015), they are subject to a new value system, which is inevitably 
also transformative, whether in China or elsewhere. How this transformation 
takes place and what it looks like can only be evaluated within specific socio-
political and cultural contexts. Maintaining this degree of detachedness has, 
however, been the biggest challenge in my fieldwork as I was always treading 
the narrow path between ‘UNESCO extremes’ and ‘China extremes’. 
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5.3 Ruins on Ruins: Forgetting, Commemorating,  
and Re-Forgetting the Third Front
Paul Kendall
During 2011 and 2012, I did fieldwork in the small city of Kaili studying—
among other things—its branding as a tourist destination of singing and danc-
ing ethnic minorities. Branding turned out to be pervasive in this autonomous 
prefectural capital of southeast Guizhou, including the physical imprint of eth-
nic minority motifs upon nearly all official leisure spaces (see Kendall 2019). 
I was therefore surprised in 2013 to learn that a small park had been built in 
Kaili to celebrate not ethnic minorities but the Third Front, a 1960s Maoist 
military–industrial project constructed in response to the threat of nuclear war 
amid some of China’s most inhospitable terrain, including the mountain valleys 
around Kaili. On a further trip in 2018, I returned to find the park in ruins. In 
the following paragraphs, I analyse the park’s rapid rise and fall as a manifesta-
tion of tensions between recent nationwide efforts to repackage the Third Front 
as industrial heritage and a city brand that stresses rural minority culture rather 
than Maoist industry. 
During the 1960s and ‘70s, 11 Third Front factories were constructed at a 
distance of around 5–10 km from the (then) small town of Kaili in accordance 
with a central directive that these war factories should be dispersed, hidden and 
located in mountain valleys. During the post-Mao era, in contrast, the munici-
pal government has marketed Kaili as a tourist destination of exotic minority 
culture, while all but one Third Front factory has relocated or gone bankrupt. 
City brands are synecdoches (following Massey 2007, 41–2 on London’s ‘strat-
egy of synecdoche’), in the sense that a preferred part (or ‘unique selling point’) 
provides a simplified representation of a complex whole. In the branding of 
Kaili, the preferred part has been the exoticised cultural practices of the Miao 
and Dong minorities, while the Third Front has been almost entirely over-
looked. Indeed, there is a tension between images of industrial spaces—with 
their contemporary associations of homogeneity and pollution—and Kaili’s 
brand as a place to escape the stress of the big city and experience untainted 
rural minority culture. Monikers attached to Kaili, such as the ‘homeland of 100 
festivals’ (baijie zhi xiang 百节之乡), refer to the festivals of minority groups 
who have long been associated with the rural and the primitive, rather than 
with industrial production. There is also a certain hostility towards the Third 
Front in Kaili, with some local residents remembering factory workers–many 
of whom came from big cities—as aloof and arrogant. 
I was therefore surprised in 2013 to come across a couple of online articles 
which described the ongoing construction of a Third Front park in Kaili. Later 
that year, I visited this unexpected commemoration to industrial heritage. The 
small park was located far outside the city centre next to the ruins of a former 
Third Front factory. A towering, renovated Mao statue visually dominated the 
Heritage and Memory 97
park, with visual support provided by mock tanks and guns as well as com-
memorative plaques. The park was deserted, difficult-to-reach, and only occa-
sionally depicted in local media, in contrast to ethnicised spaces such as the 
Nationalities Stadium which have featured heavily alongside pictures of Miao 
villages in touristic representations of Kaili. Nevertheless, the park’s mere exist-
ence fascinated me, given the lack of representation that the Third Front had 
previously been accorded within the built environment of the city. 
Looking beyond Kaili, this neglect of the Third Front has not been representa-
tive of recent governmental approaches in southwest China. In fact, many local 
governments and businesses have come to regard the Third Front as exploitable 
heritage, given its visually striking combination of industrial architecture and 
picturesque rural surroundings, as well as its narrative of heroic patriotic work-
ers. Discourse is always on the move, and understandings of the Third Front 
have become intertwined with the rampant production of national heritage, 
as it extends even to include Maoist industry. Thus, the municipal government 
of neighbouring Duyun in south Guizhou has transformed one former fac-
tory site into a Third Front museum. And in the suburbs of Guiyang, another 
 former factory site has been shaped into a variation on the 798 Art Zone theme, 
as a site of consumption and commemoration including museum, art gallery, 
shopping mall and cinema. 
A city brand typically stresses the unique selling point of a place. It shapes 
and promotes a tamed, managed form of difference. However, there is also a 
defensive, hedging quality to many city brands, so that a unique selling point 
may be complemented—or even contradicted—by emulations of other cities’ 
unique selling points. So if Guiyang has been developing its reputation as a big 
data city, then Kaili develops its own big data centre. And if multiple cities in 
Guizhou have Third Front commemorative sites, then it would be best for Kaili 
to avoid being different, even if difference is what makes a city brand stand out. 
When I visited Kaili in 2018, I found that the park—a commemoration 
to ruined factories—had itself fallen into ruin. Grass and flower beds were 
untended while plaques were faded or broken. The Mao statue also seemed to 
Fig 5.3.a: Third Front park. Photos by the author.
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be facing in the opposite direction to how I remembered. In 2013, Mao’s face 
and upraised hand could be seen from the road that passed in front of the park, 
with the factory’s ruins to the rear of the park. In 2018, the road provided a 
view of Mao’s backside in one direction and a view of a new luxury residen-
tial complex in the other direction. It eventually dawned on me that the road 
had been moved so that it now cut through where part of the park had previ-
ously been located, while the residential complex stood where the ruins of Fac-
tory 210 had been located. On the residential side of the road was an impeccably 
tended space of greenery, in contrast to the semi-abandoned Third Front park.
In 2013, a huge billboard close to the park had advertised the impending 
arrival of this residential complex, whose name ‘Mountain and City’ (shan yu 
cheng 山与城) encapsulated a tricky PR balancing act of depicting the complex 
as not only surrounded by greenery but also close to urban amenities. Fortui-
tously, a park constitutes both greenery and urban amenity, and the complex’s 
profile must have been enhanced during initial advertising by the presence of 
the new park at its main entrance. In 2015, the residential complex’s profile was 
further boosted by the announcement—covered by Kaili Online (Kaili wang 凯
里网) —that the existing 58-mu park would be expanded into a 260-mu park 
including Third Front-style buildings, a museum, underground car park and, 
of course, ethnic minority architecture. It would be ‘constructed according 
to the AAAA standards for scenic sites’, although, as of 2019, it did not feature 
in the Guizhou Government’s official directory of AAAA sites. 
Fig 5.3.b: Mao statue and residential complex, Kaili. Photo by the author.
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In 2016, Civilised Kaili Online (Kaili wenming wang 凯里文明网) reported 
that work on the first stage of this new Third Front commemorative project was 
80% complete. On my 2018 trip, work looked nowhere near complete. In 2020, 
the promoters have seemingly gone not so much for a soft business opening 
as a silent opening, with no online indication that the new park has formally 
opened. Regardless of physical realities, Kaili is now frequently mentioned 
when online articles on the Third Front provide lists of cities that have Third 
Front commemorative sites. However, it remains to be seen to what extent the 
project will represent a genuine branding attempt to recognise the complexities 
of Kaili’s urban development, as built not just on the brand of ethnic tourism 
but also the construction efforts of Third Front workers. 
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5.4 Complex Collections, Contentious Memories: Reflections 
on the Jianchuan Museum Cluster
Lisheng Zhang
The first item visitors see in the Jianchuan Museum Complex (JMC), China’s 
largest non-state museum, is a red gantry crane. In its overwhelming immen-
sity, the 20 x 12 metre steel structure, acquired from a city stricken during the 
2008 Wenchuan Earthquake, serves as the museum’s entrance gate, bearing 
the name ‘Jianchuan Museum Complex’ (Jianchuan Bowuguan Juluo 建川博
物馆聚落), in the handwriting of its founder and director, Mr. Fan Jianchuan. 
The sheer scale of its entrance distinguishes the JMC from the landscape of its 
locale, a historic small town called Anren, just outside Chengdu, in Sichuan 
Province, southwestern China. Through the crane stands a statue of a gun-
holding soldier, erected on top of a 40-ton Second World War Japanese bunker 
shipped from Tianjin, a northern port city some 1850 kilometres away. Behind 
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it, a 1000-metre drive, lined with giant bamboo towering exuberantly over a 
narrow footpath on each side, leads to the main compound of over 82 acres, 
housing 30 individual museums, each dedicated to a specific theme related to 
the memories of the Resistance War against Japan (1931–1945), the Mao Era 
(1949–1976), the 2008 Wenchuan Earthquake and Chinese folk culture in the 
past hundred years. 
Developed since 2003, the JMC is built upon the personal collection of Fan 
Jianchuan, a self-made multimillionaire and collector who has amassed over 
eight million items over the past 30 years. His collection ranges from retired 
tanks, missiles, and airplanes to suicide notes, personal diaries, and photo-
graphs from the Cultural Revolution. While the museums display only a small 
portion of the collection, the majority is stored in a huge warehouse that opens 
exclusively to invited guests and employees. 
From 2015 to 2017, I spent 15 months as a voluntary worker at the JMC 
conducting fieldwork for my PhD research as part of the Leverhulme-funded 
project Conflict in Cultural Value: Localities and Heritage in Southwest China, 
and had the opportunity of visiting the museum warehouse a few times. 
Being in the presence of the entire collection is a formidable experience. 
Stepping into the warehouse, one is immersed in long lines of shelves of Mao 
busts, clocks, teacups, radios, and mirrors from the Maoist period. Along the 
walls, huge piles of vintage posters and newspapers reach up to the high ceil-
ing. Going further, one comes across lines of closed bookshelves with A4 signs 
noting ‘Cultural Revolution Materials’ in bold. These shelves are stuffed with 
Fig 5.4.a: Entrance to the Jianchuan Museum Complex. Photo by the author.
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documents wrapped in plastic bags, containing personal profiles, trial records, 
self-criticism letters, complaint documents, rehabilitation documents, and so 
on. Mostly handwritten, these crisp and yellowish pieces of paper were items 
that had the power to have people imprisoned, persecuted, and their fami-
lies broken. I remember myself breathing heavily while walking amongst the 
shelves, pondering the number of individuals being documented here by what 
lay quietly and banally in front of me. Yet the questions that really matter seem 
to be ‘who were they?’ and ‘where are they now?’
Equally worth considering as the destiny of their authors is the destiny of the 
documents themselves. Upstairs, there are six full rooms of photo albums and 
diaries Fan collected during home clearances in the 1990s. These images of total 
strangers, and brief or lengthy accounts of their days, are of the most ordinary 
hence familiar contents: trips to the park on a sunny day, family gatherings, the 
first day back to school after holidays, significant moments in a relationship. I 
refrained from photographing these diaries and photographs, for I found them 
simply too private, too intimate for some random spectator like myself.
With the earliest acquisitions made during and shortly after the Cultural 
Revolution, Fan’s collecting took on momentum in the early 1990s with the 
emergence of antique markets across the country, where he travelled exten-
sively and frequently. Over the years Fan cultivated a countrywide network of 
antique traders specialising in twentieth century collectibles. The museum’s 
50,000 Mao-era mirrors were acquired by 20 of his contacts going through vil-
lages in different parts of China with loudspeakers looping the voice message 
‘there is a crazy guy from Sichuan who wants to trade new mirrors for your old 
Fig 5.4.b: Fan Jianchuan’s collection warehouse. Photo by the author.
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ones and give you five yuan!’ Since 2009, the JMC has been running an annual 
Red Collectors Forum (Hongse shoucang jiaoliuhui 红色收藏交流会) where 
these traders gather to showcase their collections, network, and most impor-
tantly, sell their items to the museum. Given the quantity and miscellany of its 
collection, the JMC’s cataloguing process has never been able to keep up with 
its acquisition, and only about 15% of its collection were catalogued by 2017.
The JMC is one of the very few museums in the country that has ever been 
able to address some of its most politically contentious memories. The early 
museums in the complex, opened from 2005 to 2010, are engaged with ‘sensi-
tive’ topics such as the Chinese Nationalist Party (Guomindang 国民党) and 
the Cultural Revolution that have been largely marginalised or completely 
obliterated in official museum narratives. Highlighting the power of ‘real arte-
facts’, which the JMC possesses abundantly and often displays in unusually 
large quantities, with contextual explanations kept to a minimum, these muse-
ums create uniquely affective and evocative experiences.
In the meantime, the project has also been developed as a profitable business 
since around 2010. It now welcomes close to two million visitors a year and 
has successfully branched out to museum planning and construction, working 
with local governments across the country. In 2018, it opened another group 
of eight museums in the nearby megalopolis, Chongqing. Therefore, though 
non-state, it is deeply enmeshed with government authority in political and 
economic terms. 
The largest non-state material culture repository of China’s twentieth cen-
tury history, the JMC speaks amply of the moral and political complexities in 
remembering, collecting as well as understanding the museum and heritage 
industry in China today. And yet the vast majority of its collection remains 
unavailable for research or display, and the future of this unprecedented and 
gigantic project is still a story unfolding.
